



**Doctorado en Ciencias Económicas
Organización Industrial III
Dr. Daniel Flores Curiel**

Objetivo General:

Proporcionar al estudiante conocimiento y herramientas que le permitan entender y analizar la regulación económica.

Contenido Temático

I. Instrumentos de Regulación.

- Peak Load Pricing

Keeler and Smith (1977) “Optimal Peak-Load Pricing, Investment and Service Levels on Urban Expressways”, *Journal of Political Economy* 85, pp. 1-25.

Wenders (1976) “Peak Load Pricing in the Electric Utility Industry”, *Bell Journal of Economics* 7, pp. 232-241.

- Precios de Ramsey (OR, Cap. 4)

Scott (1986) “Assessing USA Postal Ratemaking: an application of Ramsey Prices”, *Journal of Industrial Economics* 34, pp. 279-290.

Wedig (1993) “Ramsey pricing and supply-side incentives in physician markets”, *Journal of Health Economics* 12, pp. 365-384.

- Precios de Acceso y Precios Tope (TIPR, Cap. 5)

Flores, “Price cap regulation in the Mexican telephone industry” *Information Economics and Policy* 17, 2005.

- Quality Regulation

Oi. W. (1973) “The economics of product safety”, *Bell Journal of Economics* 4, pp. 3-28.



Spence (1977) “Consumer misperceptions, product failure and producer liability”, *Review of Economic Studies* 44, 561-572.

Chipty (1995) “Economic effects of quality regulations in the day-care industry” *American Economic Review* 85, 419-424.

Flores (2009) “All you can drink: should we worry about quality”, *Journal of Regulatory Economics* 35, pp. 1-18.

II. Estudio de Casos

a) Prácticas Facilitadoras

Holt and Scheffman, “Facilitating practices: the effects of advance notice and best-price policies”, *Rand Journal of Economics* 18, 1987.

b) Líneas Aéreas

(ERA, Cap. 17)

Brueckner, Dyer y Spiller. “Fare determination in airline hub-and-spoke networks” *Rand Journal of Economics* 23, 1992.

c) Televisión

Vita y Wiegand, “Must-Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Economic Policy Analysis”, *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, 1993.

Chae y Flores, “Broadcasting versus narrowcasting” *Information Economics and Policy* 10, 1998.

d) Subastas

Gibbons, R. (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.

Milgrom, P. “Auctions and bidding: a primer” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Ausubel y Cramton “Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions” Working Paper 96-07, University of Maryland, 1996.



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Economía

UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE NUEVO LEÓN

FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA \ DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

Bibliografía

- Vernon, Viscusi and Harrington (1996), Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. MIT Press. (ERA)
- Lafonte and Tirole (1994) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press. (TIPR)
- Train (1991) Optimal Regulation. MIT Press. (OR)

Evaluación

La evaluación se hará de acuerdo a lo siguiente:

Examen parcial (40%)

Examen final (40%)

Ejercicios (20%)